What Would America Lose Without Europe?

The Question Washington Rarely Asks

America keeps asking what Europe would do without the United States.

Perhaps Washington should start asking what the United States would do without Europe.

Imagine a map of the world without guaranteed American access to European airfields, ports, logistics centres, military headquarters and intelligence partnerships.

The aircraft would still exist. The carriers would still sail. The nuclear arsenal would remain.

But the map would change.

Distance would become more expensive. Military operations would become harder to sustain. Access once taken for granted would have to be negotiated. And political influence built over generations could begin to disappear.

For decades, Europe has been portrayed in American political debates as a security burden: a continent protected by American taxpayers, dependent on American soldiers and unwilling to defend itself.

That account contains part of the truth. Europe has relied heavily on American military capabilities, and serious gaps remain in its independent defence capacity.

But it omits the other half of the relationship.

The United States did not build a global military presence in Europe solely because Europeans needed protection. It built that presence because Europe is strategically indispensable to American power.

And that raises a question more consequential than another argument over NATO spending.

What happens when a global power begins treating the allies who sustain its reach as though they are expendable?

1The Military Geography America Cannot Easily Replace

The United States possesses extraordinary military capabilities. But global power is not simply the ability to strike a target thousands of kilometres away.

It is the ability to arrive, remain, resupply, repair, coordinate and operate repeatedly.

That requires infrastructure.

According to a June 2026 Congressional Research Service report, the US European Command area of responsibility contained 30 long-established American military bases and 19 additional military sites used by or accessible to US forces.

Those facilities are part of a much larger network of agreements, allied installations, communications systems and transport corridors.

The important point is not the number alone.

It is what those locations make possible.

Germany: America's European Command Backbone

Ramstein Air Base is not simply a runway in Germany.

It is the headquarters of US Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa, the air component supporting American military responsibilities across two major regional commands.

Stuttgart hosts US European Command and US Africa Command.

Wiesbaden hosts US Army Europe and Africa.

Consider the geography.

American military organisations responsible for European security and significant operations connected to Africa are headquartered thousands of kilometres from Washington — on German territory.

That arrangement exists because Germany offers a strategically valuable location, developed infrastructure and a long-established alliance relationship.

Could those headquarters be relocated?

Yes.

But relocation would require new agreements, facilities, communications networks, personnel arrangements and considerable expense.

The United States could move offices.

Rebuilding the entire supporting ecosystem would be another matter.

Italy: The Mediterranean Advantage

Naples hosts US Naval Forces Europe–Africa and the US Sixth Fleet.

Italy also provides important aviation and naval infrastructure through installations including Aviano Air Base and Naval Air Station Sigonella.

These facilities support operations in a region connecting southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

The Mediterranean is not a peripheral body of water.

It connects critical maritime routes, commercial interests, military theatres and regions in which American governments have repeatedly chosen to intervene.

Forward infrastructure in Italy allows American forces to operate with options that would be more difficult to reproduce from North America alone.

Spain: A Strategic Gateway

Naval Station Rota, in southern Spain, provides the US Navy with a forward position near the approaches to the Mediterranean.

It supports naval operations, logistics and the deployment of American guided-missile destroyers.

Rota matters because warships are not sustained by strategic ambition.

They need fuel, maintenance, supplies, crews and accessible facilities.

A ship capable of crossing an ocean is not automatically capable of maintaining the same operational tempo without forward support.

Britain: More Than Airfields

RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall support important American air operations.

Britain also maintains exceptionally close intelligence and military relationships with Washington.

This cooperation provides something less visible than an aircraft carrier but often just as strategically significant: trusted access to information, institutions and operational coordination.

Those relationships were built over decades.

They cannot be replaced instantly by purchasing new technology.

The Larger Point

From Germany to Italy, Spain and Britain, European territory gives the United States proximity to strategically important regions.

The United States pays to operate its forces.

Its allies provide territory, access, infrastructure and cooperation.

That is not charity. It is an exchange of strategic value.

2Technology Does Not Abolish Geography

There is an obvious objection.

America has long-range bombers, aerial refuelling aircraft, satellites, submarines and aircraft carriers.

Why should it need European bases at all?

Because the ability to reach a battlefield is not the same as the ability to sustain operations there.

A long-range aircraft may be capable of striking from a distant base. But flying greater distances can increase demands on fuel, tankers, crews, maintenance and mission planning.

A naval force can operate far from home. But its endurance still depends on supply, repair, ammunition and access to supporting infrastructure.

Satellites can provide intelligence and communications. They cannot perform every function of a port, airfield, repair facility or forward logistics hub.

Modern technology extends military reach.

It does not eliminate the costs of distance.

The United States would retain considerable global strike capability without European access.

What it could lose is part of the speed, flexibility, endurance and efficiency that make its present global military posture so formidable.

There is a difference between being able to reach almost anywhere and being able to operate almost anywhere on favourable terms.

That difference is where alliances become military power.

3The Bases Are Not American Territory

There is another fact often overlooked in public debate.

American military installations in European countries do not automatically become sovereign American territory.

Their legal status depends on agreements with the countries that host them, including NATO-related arrangements and bilateral agreements.

Host governments retain sovereignty.

That does not mean European leaders could necessarily seize every installation overnight. Different agreements establish different rights, responsibilities and procedures.

But it does mean American military access ultimately depends on political relationships and legal arrangements.

If those relationships deteriorate sufficiently, governments can seek to renegotiate, restrict or terminate access under applicable rules.

That would be a profound strategic problem for Washington.

Not because European armies would need to defeat American forces.

But because military power cannot indefinitely substitute for the political consent on which overseas access rests.

A base can be equipped with aircraft, weapons, communications systems and thousands of personnel.

It still needs a host country willing to let it operate.

The most powerful military in the world cannot manufacture sovereign territory in another country.

And that is why trust is not merely a diplomatic courtesy.

It is a strategic asset.

4The Economic Relationship Washington Cannot Ignore

Now consider the other side of American power.

Money.

According to European Union figures, trade in goods and services between the EU and United States reached approximately €1.77 trillion in 2025.

That is almost €4.9 billion in transatlantic commerce every day.

In 2024, stocks of mutual foreign direct investment exceeded €4.8 trillion.

These figures describe an economic relationship of extraordinary depth.

American businesses sell goods, technology, financial services and intellectual property to European customers.

European companies invest in American factories, infrastructure, research facilities and jobs.

The relationship is not a transfer of wealth from one generous country to an ungrateful continent.

It is an integrated economic system from which both sides benefit.

And Washington has much to lose if that system is damaged.

The American Jobs Behind the Numbers

European Commission figures estimate that American exports of goods and services to the EU support millions of US jobs.

European-owned companies also employ millions of workers in the United States.

Those jobs exist in real communities.

They support families, local businesses, tax revenues and industrial activity.

A deterioration in transatlantic relations would not automatically destroy them.

But prolonged trade barriers, reduced investment and commercial uncertainty could put parts of that employment at risk.

The consequences would not remain confined to Brussels, Berlin or Paris.

They could be felt in American factories, offices, ports and research centres.

The Trade Deficit Is Not the Whole Story

American political rhetoric often focuses on the trade deficit in goods.

But services tell a different story.

US Trade Representative figures show that in 2025, the United States recorded a goods trade deficit with the EU of approximately $220 billion, while maintaining a services trade surplus of about $107 billion.

American firms are highly competitive in sectors such as digital services, finance and intellectual property.

Looking only at the goods deficit hides much of that strength.

It also hides how much American prosperity depends on European demand.

America does not merely buy from Europe. It sells to Europe, invests in Europe and earns from Europe.

A trade relationship can be unequal in particular sectors without being a one-sided burden.

5The Defence Industry Has More to Lose Than a Sale

The economic relationship extends into military procurement.

European governments purchase American aircraft, missile systems, helicopters, communications technology and other defence equipment.

But military procurement is not like buying an ordinary consumer product.

A complex weapons system can create decades of demand for maintenance, spare parts, software updates, training, weapons integration and future upgrades.

That long-term relationship can benefit American manufacturers well beyond the original sale.

Now imagine a Europe increasingly determined to reduce strategic dependence on Washington.

European governments might prioritise domestic manufacturers, joint European procurement, diversified suppliers and systems that can be maintained without relying on American political approval.

That transition would be difficult.

European industries do not yet produce every capability they require at sufficient scale.

Replacing existing fleets would be expensive, and decades of interoperability cannot be rewritten overnight.

But even a gradual shift could alter the future market for American defence companies.

The risk is not that Europe suddenly stops using American equipment.

The risk is that Washington's political behaviour encourages European governments to design their next generation of military systems around reduced American dependence.

A defence contract lost today is one thing.

A customer relationship lost for the next thirty years is another.

6The Invisible Power of Intelligence and Sanctions

Military bases and trade figures are relatively easy to describe.

Intelligence cooperation is harder to measure.

Yet it is fundamental to the transatlantic relationship.

American and European intelligence organisations exchange information, coordinate security operations and draw on their different geographic and institutional strengths.

The United States has enormous independent intelligence capabilities.

But allied intelligence networks provide additional perspectives, access and regional expertise.

If political trust deteriorates, cooperation may become more limited.

The result would not necessarily be immediate intelligence blindness.

It could be a gradual loss of coverage, coordination and confidence.

The same principle applies to economic sanctions.

The United States has formidable financial leverage, particularly through the dollar and its financial system.

But sanctions often become more effective when Europe participates.

European institutions, markets, banks, companies and regulatory authorities can reinforce restrictions that Washington imposes.

Without that cooperation, enforcement can become more complicated.

Economic pressure does not disappear.

It becomes less coordinated.

And the political weight of collective action is reduced.

A coalition can impose costs that one country, however powerful, may struggle to reproduce alone.

That is one reason alliances matter beyond the battlefield.

7The Strongest Argument Against This Thesis

Let us confront the obvious counterargument.

The United States is not a helpless giant dependent on Europe for survival.

It possesses a vast domestic economy, an extensive industrial and technological base, a powerful navy, strategic airlift, nuclear deterrence and military partnerships across the world.

It could relocate certain operations, develop alternative facilities and adjust its military posture.

Some European countries would also be reluctant to sever relations, particularly while facing the threat posed by Russia.

A complete, coordinated European withdrawal of military access is therefore not a realistic baseline forecast.

It is a hypothetical scenario illustrating the value of the existing network.

The more plausible risk is gradual fragmentation.

A restricted facility here.

A delayed agreement there.

A defence contract awarded elsewhere.

An intelligence relationship narrowed.

A government that no longer assumes Washington will act predictably.

Each individual change might appear manageable.

Together, they could alter the balance of transatlantic power.

The United States would remain a superpower.

But it could find itself paying more to achieve less.

And some advantages accumulated over generations might not be recoverable simply by increasing the military budget.

8Europe Would Pay a Price Too

There is no serious case for pretending that Europe could abandon the United States without consequences.

European militaries still depend on American capabilities in important areas, including intelligence, strategic transport, command systems and certain advanced weapons.

European businesses benefit enormously from American markets and investment.

A severe transatlantic rupture could weaken deterrence against Russia, disrupt supply chains and damage both economies.

That is why the goal of European strategic autonomy should not automatically be the destruction of the transatlantic relationship.

It should be the ability to make independent decisions when national and European interests require them.

A partnership becomes healthier when neither side can use dependency as a permanent instrument of coercion.

Europe needs stronger defence capabilities.

America needs allies who trust its commitments.

Both have work to do.

But acknowledging mutual dependence does not justify political intimidation.

An alliance cannot remain an alliance if one participant increasingly treats cooperation as obedience.

9The Power That Cannot Be Purchased

For generations, American influence has depended on something beyond military superiority.

Other countries chose to cooperate.

They allowed access to territory.

They participated in institutions.

They aligned policies.

They trusted American commitments enough to make long-term decisions around them.

That trust was never unconditional, and American foreign policy has repeatedly fallen short of its stated principles.

But the network endured because enough governments concluded that cooperation served their interests.

That is the foundation Washington risks weakening when political leaders portray allies as liabilities, threaten their sovereignty or suggest security commitments are merely bargaining chips.

The danger is not that Europe will wake up tomorrow and close every American military installation.

The danger is that European governments will begin planning a future in which American access, American equipment and American leadership are no longer assumed to be the safest choices.

Once those decisions become embedded in budgets, infrastructure and industrial strategy, reversing them may take decades.

And this is the paradox.

A government may believe it is demonstrating strength by pressuring allies.

But if that pressure persuades allies to become less dependent on it, the result may be a long-term reduction in its own influence.

Dominance can force compliance for a moment. Trust can sustain cooperation for generations.

Confusing the two is a strategic mistake.

Conclusion: The Alliance Was Never Charity

America does not need Europe to exist.

It does not need Europe to remain a nuclear power.

It does not need Europe to maintain a formidable military or a major economy.

But maintaining the same global reach, operational flexibility, economic integration and diplomatic influence without European cooperation would be a different challenge entirely.

Germany helps host American command structures.

Italy and Spain provide strategically valuable military access.

Britain contributes military infrastructure and intelligence cooperation.

European markets support American businesses.

European investment supports American employment.

European participation strengthens coordinated international action.

None of this means Europe is more powerful than the United States.

It means that American power is greater because Europe chooses to cooperate with it.

For decades, Washington understood that principle well enough to build one of the most extensive alliance networks in history.

It would be an extraordinary act of strategic self-harm to weaken that network while insisting it had never mattered.

And perhaps that is the question the transatlantic debate should finally confront.

Not whether Europe owes America gratitude.

Not whether America owes Europe protection.

But whether the most powerful country in the world understands how much of its influence depends on other countries choosing to stand beside it.

America built an alliance that multiplied its power.

It should think carefully before treating that alliance as a burden.

Hrvoje Pavić — Independent Geopolitical Analysis

Sources: Congressional Research Service, June 2026, U.S. European Command, USAFE-AFAFRICA fact sheet, Council of the EU, EU-US trade, USTR, European Union, European Commission, EU-US trade and investment.

Source: Velaris Brief